

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

26 March 1976

NOTE FOR AD/DCI/IC *dh*

1. We think there is a serious deficiency in the Carver memo. It should be corrected before it is forwarded to the DCI. His memo concerns only problems of a wartime situation. The more fundamental issue is what is the role of the DCI in a crisis situation--"big C" or "little c?"

2. We suggest the addition of a full paragraph following his paragraph 3, a transitional sentence into his paragraph 4 (attached), and some minor fixes throughout the memo that will accord with our basic criticism regarding, again, "big C" and "little c."

3.  is preparing some additional thoughts on the crisis problem, which we will be sending to you later, but which are not necessary for this afternoon's conversations.

DC/PRD

Attachments:

Carver memo of 25 Mar 76

Suggested additions

**ACTION**

SECRET/

25X1

3a. In addition to the above problems that would relate directly to a "big C" crisis, we have continuing command problems related to "little c" crises such as developed over Cyprus and the Mayaguez seizure. The issues here do not involve the reassignment of resources and authority, but they do concern the position of the DCI as the spokesman on national intelligence and his responsibilities regarding the tasking of national intelligence resources. The basic questions are: where is the national situation room in a crisis situation, under whose authority is crisis reporting issued, what are the procedures for tasking the national and tactical collection assets, and what is the interrelationship between national intelligence and the relevant operational plans and actions? Some work has been done in these areas within CIA and DOD. It is so far rather conflicting and uncoordinated.

4. So the problem is not simply the issue of wartime contingency planning. It is the role of the "principal intelligence advisor to the President" during warning and crisis situations of all types.

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